Change only the sex.
Pick an event below. Everything else stays constant — same conduct, same institution. The only thing that changes is the sex of the person it happens to. See what changes with it, and what doesn't.
A spouse experiences violence in the home. Does the statutory route stay the same if the sex changes?
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
A dedicated civil statute: protection orders, the right to stay in the shared household, monetary relief, all through a Magistrate, faster than a criminal trial.
General criminal law only
No equivalent central statute. General BNS provisions on hurt, assault and criminal intimidation still apply to the conduct — but there is no dedicated protection-order or residence-order machinery built for him.
What this does not mean: That violence against a husband is lawful, or that he has zero recourse. It means the specific, purpose-built civil architecture — the thing that makes PWDVA faster and more practical than a criminal case — doesn't have a mirror version for him.
A spouse is subjected to cruelty by the other spouse or their relatives. Same offence either way?
BNS §§85–86 (matrimonial cruelty)
A specific criminal offence naming the husband or his relatives as the class of persons who commit it, and the wife as the person it protects.
General offences only
No mirror BNS provision exists for cruelty by a wife or her relatives against a husband. General offences — hurt, criminal intimidation, defamation — may apply depending on the conduct, but not this specific, purpose-built offence.
What this does not mean: That a husband has no legal options at all, or that this offence is illegitimate — it responds to a well-documented pattern of dowry-linked abuse. It means the offence itself, as drafted, only runs in one direction.
Someone is sexually harassed at work. Does the statutory complaint mechanism cover him the way it covers her?
POSH Act, 2013
A statutory Internal Committee mechanism with a defined complainant category: an “aggrieved woman.” Employers above a threshold size are legally required to run it.
Employer policy, if any
No POSH statutory route exists for him. Many employers voluntarily extend the same Internal Committee process to everyone — but that's a company policy choice, not a right written into the Act.
What this does not mean: That an employer can't run a gender-neutral process, or that no remedy exists — general law and internal policy may still apply. It means the POSH Act's own statutory mechanism is written for women specifically.
This is the starkest one on this page — read the whole verdict, not just the badge.
BNS rape provisions
A specific statutory definition covering acts by a man against a woman, with its own evidentiary framework and sentencing structure built for exactly this offence.
No equivalent offence exists
The BNS dropped the old IPC §377 provision — which used to cover non-consensual acts against a man — with no replacement. The practical fallback is a general “hurt” or “grievous hurt” charge, which doesn't name the conduct as sexual at all.
What this does not mean: That non-consensual sexual violence against a man is legal. It means there is currently no offence in the BNS that treats it as the specific category of harm it is — not “no reverse route,” but no route at all, for this specific category.
A spouse needs the fast, summary maintenance route. Is it open to either of them equally?
BNSS §144
A fast-track summary route naming “wife” (including a divorced wife who hasn't remarried), children and parents as eligible claimants.
HMA §§24–§25 — a different, slower route
BNSS §144 itself doesn't name husbands. But the Hindu Marriage Act's maintenance provisions are gender-neutral, letting either spouse apply — inside a divorce or judicial-separation proceeding, not as a standalone summary claim.
What this does not mean: That husbands can never get maintenance — they can, under a different statute. It means the specific fast summary route and the general, litigation-attached route are not the same thing, and which one applies depends on which statute you're actually invoking.
This one isn't really “woman vs man” — it's certainty vs presumption. Worth seeing why.
Legitimacy is a fact of birth
A child's mother is never in legal doubt — maternity is established by the birth itself, not by a rebuttable legal presumption.
BSA §116 — a rebuttable presumption
A husband is presumed the legal father if the child was born during a valid marriage. He can't get a DNA test simply by asking — courts require a real evidentiary foundation, typically proof of non-access, before ordering one.
What this does not mean: That DNA evidence is meaningless, or that paternity can never be challenged. It means legal fatherhood and biological fatherhood are treated as separate questions in a way legal motherhood never has to be.
Since decriminalisation, does it still matter — and does it matter the same way for both spouses?
Divorce ground (neutral) + a maintenance consequence
Either spouse can raise the other's adultery as a divorce ground under the Hindu Marriage Act — that part is symmetric. But a wife specifically can be disqualified from BNSS §144 maintenance if she is “living in adultery.”
Divorce ground (neutral), no equivalent maintenance clause
A husband's adultery is an equally valid divorce ground against him. There's no equivalent maintenance-forfeiture clause running the other way, because BNSS §144 is a wife's claimant provision in the first place.
What this does not mean: That a wife's adultery has no legal weight, or that a husband's has none either — both remain valid grounds for divorce, symmetrically. The asymmetry is narrower: a specific consequence tucked inside a specific maintenance statute, not the whole subject of adultery.
This is one method, applied seven times.
Every law behind every scenario here has its own full entry, its own source, and its own checked date.