Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) sections 85 and 86 — carrying forward the earlier IPC section 498A — specifically criminalise cruelty by a husband or his relatives against a woman. "Cruelty" is defined to include conduct likely to drive a woman to suicide or grave injury, and harassment linked to unlawful demands for property or valuable security.
What this does not mean: That harmful conduct by a wife against a husband is lawful. General offences covering hurt, criminal intimidation, defamation and similar conduct can still apply to that behaviour. What is sex-specific is this particular matrimonial-cruelty offence: it is defined as cruelty by a husband/his relatives against a wife, not as a spouse-neutral offence.
The BNS rape provisions are drafted around specified sexual acts committed by a man against a woman. The statutory definition also retains a marital exception where the wife is not under eighteen years of age.
What this does not mean: That an adult male victim of comparable non-consensual conduct has a clean statutory equivalent elsewhere in the BNS. Unlike the old Indian Penal Code — which, alongside the sex-specific rape offence, also had Section 377, covering non-consensual acts against a man, woman or animal — the BNS dropped Section 377 entirely and did not replace it. Reporting on the practical effect describes a male victim of comparable conduct as currently having to rely on general provisions such as hurt or grievous hurt, which do not name the conduct as a sexual offence at all. This is a narrower and more serious gap than "some other provision probably covers it."
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) section 144 — carrying forward the earlier CrPC section 125 — creates a summary, fast-track maintenance route for a wife, children, and parents who are unable to maintain themselves. "Wife" is defined to include a divorced woman who has not remarried.
What this does not mean: That maintenance law across India is only ever available to women, or that a husband can never receive financial support through any legal route. Other matrimonial statutes (for example, provisions in personal law or the Hindu Marriage Act framework) can and do contain more gender-neutral maintenance powers. The specific point here is narrower: this particular summary criminal-procedure route is not drafted as a spouse-to-spouse, gender-neutral remedy — it names wife, children and parents as the eligible claimants.
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA) section 116 — carrying forward the earlier Evidence Act section 112 — provides that birth during a valid marriage (or within 280 days of its dissolution, where the mother remains unmarried) is conclusive proof of legitimacy, unless it can be shown that the spouses had no access to each other at any time when the child could have been conceived. The Supreme Court has repeatedly treated DNA testing in such disputes as an exceptional step rather than a routine, automatic one.
What this does not mean: That DNA evidence is meaningless, or that courts never order it. It means legal paternity and biological paternity are treated as separable questions: a man legally treated as the father under this presumption is not automatically entitled to a DNA test simply because he doubts biological fatherhood — courts weigh the presumption, the child's interests, and privacy considerations before ordering testing.
The 2013 central workplace statute, commonly called the POSH Act, defines its statutory complainant category as an "aggrieved woman." It requires workplaces above a threshold size to constitute an Internal Committee to receive and inquire into complaints under the Act.
What this does not mean: That an employer cannot maintain a gender-neutral harassment policy, or that no other remedy exists for a man who is harassed at work. Many employers extend Internal Committee-style processes to all employees as a matter of policy, and general criminal or civil remedies may still apply to the underlying conduct. What is specific is that the POSH Act's own statutory complaint mechanism is written for women.
The central statute is titled the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and is built around the protection of women as "aggrieved persons." It gives an aggrieved woman civil remedies — protection orders, residence orders, monetary relief, custody orders and compensation orders — enforced through a Magistrate, with Protection Officers to assist.
What this does not mean: That harmful conduct against a man is lawful, or that a male victim has no recourse at all. Other criminal offences (such as those covering hurt, criminal intimidation, or cruelty) and civil remedies may still apply depending on the conduct. What is absent is a mirror central domestic-violence statute giving a male victim the same statutory architecture — the same protection-order and residence-order machinery — that this Act gives an aggrieved woman.
Section 3(4)(b) of the MTP Act states that, except for a minor or a person of unsound mind (who need a guardian's written consent under 3(4)(a)), no pregnancy shall be terminated except with the consent of the pregnant woman. The Act does not list a husband's consent as a requirement at any point.
What this does not mean: That abortion is available at any gestational stage, for any reason, from any provider, without satisfying the rest of the MTP Act's conditions — registered practitioners, gestational limits, and the specified medical grounds under Section 3 still apply. The autonomy question (whose consent is required) and the eligibility question (whether the abortion is lawful at all) are separate, and this entry is only about the first one.